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II. EVIDENCE FROM I-lONG KONG
ABSTRACT
Inthe first ofthetwocompanionpapers, weshowthat the dynamicaspectsof thelicense
utilization decision in an uncertain environment, together with the usual policy of rewarding high
license utilization with future license allocations, creates four components of the license price.
These are the scarcity, asset, option, and renewal value components. Each of these components
are identified and explored in the context of the existing literature. The effect of imperfections
in the license market on license price paths is also explored.
tn the second paper, we use monthly data on license prices and utilization to test for the
presence of imperfect competition in the market for apparel quota licenses in Hong Kong. A
competitive structural model which respects the dynamic aspects of the problem is developed and
estimated. We argue that concentration could affect the supply side as well as the demand side
by affecting the cost associated with the search.
The regressions indicate that concentration of license holdings affect the supply of licenses
as predicted by models of imperfect competition. Since the implementation acheme encourages
full utilization, imperfect competition affects the supply path of licenses rather than total supply.
Concentration does not affect the demand side, which means that search costs are not an
important consideration.
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The fletcher School NBER
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In a static perfectly competitive model, it is well understood that a quota license has a
scarcity value.This arisesbecause a binding quota raises the domestic price of the resirained
good above the world price, creating profits equal to this price difference for the license holders,
The size of the price difference depends on the extent of scarcity created by the quota in the
domestic market. We call this the .ccoreiiy componentofthe license price.
tn dynamic settings, the license price has two additional components. Both these are
related to the property that a license is valid for an entire year. They are the asset mar/ce!
component andthe option vofue component.Aquota license can be viewed as an asset with a
life of one year. Like any other asset, the price path of the license must be such that the license
is held voluntarily. For this to occur in a world without uncertainty, the price of the asset must
rise at the rate of interest as the latter represents the opportunity cost of holding the asset.
Therefore, the asset market component predicts that the price of a license will rise over the year.
The third component of the license price is the option value component. At any point in
time during the year, a quota holder can either use his license (by shipping the goods himself
or by making a temporary transfer to someone else) or defer his license application in the hope
of a higher price in the future if demand reatizations are high. The value of a license held today,
before the state tomorrow is known, can exceed the expected price of the license at any time in
the future since a license allows the decision on use to be deferred till the state is known. Inother words, a quota license has an •option" value.
In addition, the details of quota allocation mechanism can create other complications
which affect license prices. For example, quota allocations may be tied to past performance,
where firmswitha high quota utilization are rewarded with an increased allocation in the next
period) This creates a renewal value contponent of the license price. In Hong Kong for
example. a legal market exists for both temporary and permanent transfers of licenses to export
textiles and apparel under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Under a permanent transfer, the seller
relinquishes the use of his license in the current, and all future periods. Under a temporary
transfer, however, the seller Loses the use of his license in the current period, but retains his
renewal rights. This can create negative prices for temporary transfers of licenses as pointed cot
by Anderson (1987), and further discussed in Eldor and Marcus (1988).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical foundations for
the different components cf the license price, namely the scarcity component, the asset market
component, the option value component, and the renewal component. Section 3 relates our work
to the existing literature. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Some Simple Slodels
In this section, we present some simple models which help to explain the forces
endcrlying license price paths during the quota period. We will first present a simple model
which focoses on the option value component. Next, we use this model to look at the
implications of 'use-it-er-lose-it' restrictions on the price of temporary versus permanent
transfers. We then argue that this model is a very special one and that the option valoe
2component disappearsin interior solutions when the license price is made endogenous. Finally,
we consider the license utilization path when there is strategic interaction between the license
holders.
Model1:
Let usconsidertrade between the U.S. and Hong Kong. We assume, for simplicity, that
there are no transport costs ortariffs, andthat the quota is imposed on a homogeneousgood.
We further assume that theU.S.price ofthegood in question can take ononlytwoexogenously
given values: a(highprice) and a' (lowprice).This wouldbethe case if demand in the U.S.
is uncertain and if Hong Kong supply is such a small part of total supply to the U.S. market that
any change in the supply from Hong Kong would not affect U.S. price.
Similarly, we assume that the supply price from Hong Kong is exogenously given and
fixed at S. In other words, we are assuming that the U.S. market is a small enough part of the
total sales of Hong Kong that changes in supply to die U.S. do not affect the supply price in
Hong Kong. This assumption of infinite elasticity of supply and demand is a crucial one since
it makes the value of using a license in any state an exogenous variable. Thus, if US. demand
is high, the value of using a license is L°= a"-5;if U.S. demand is low, the value of using
a license is L' =a'-S.Let a5 > aL, and assume that L' c 0, that is, S C a'-.' The scarcity
component of the license price is reflected in these values, It is due to the presence of trade
restrictions that there exists a difference in the U.S. demand price and the Hong Kong supply
price for this good. The more restrictive the trade policy is, the greater this difference will be.
Suppose the quota license is valid for three time periods. At each point in time, there 's
3a realization of demand, either highorlow, which we call the "good" state and the bad' stale
respectively. The "good" state (denoted by the superscriptI-I)is assumed to occur with
probability t and the "had' state (denoted by the superscript L) with probability (l-sr). The
expected value of usinga license in any given timeperiod is therefore a constant and equals
P114 where:
P2(L)=TI. + (1-r)L'c (1)
After thcstate is realized, the holder of a license decides whether or not to use his
license. 'ihe sirearn of choices and values is depicted in Figure t. As usual, the system is solved
backwards. In Period 3, if the license is nut used, the payoff is zero. If it is used, the payoff is
the value of the license in the state realized, Since we assume that both U' and LL. are non-
negative. ad available licenses will be used in the flnal period. The expected license price in
Period 3.EIL), is thus E(L).
IfPeriod 2 is a good state, all the licenses will be used, since L" > öE(L) where 6 is
the discount factor. If Period 2 is a low demand state, then as lung as 3 is not too small, so that
V C OE(LJ), none of the licenses will be used.1 The lowest price at which any transaction will
occur is ÔE(L1) and this is the vaiue of owning a license in the low demand state, not LL. If the
discount factor is small enough, licenses will be used in both states. Thus, at the beginning of
Period 2. before uncertainty about the state of nature is resolved, the value of a license will
equal E(L4. where:
E(L,)nt11 + (1 n)max[L", 3E(L5)]. (2)
Similarly in Period I, if a good state occurs, all the licenses will be used since L" >
4ÔE(L,). If a bad state occurs and LL C5E(L),no licenseswill beused bulthevalue of a license
is E(L,), and not L'. TfLL >ÔE(L2),then all licenses are used and the value of a license is Li-.
Before uncertainty is resolved in Period 1, therefore, the expected value of a license, E(LJ). will
be given by;
E(LL)= it°+(I—r)max[L', 6E(L2)]. (3)
The option value arises because the license holder can defer his decision on whether or not to
use a license until after the uncertainty is realized. Deferring this decision has no value if there
is no choice left as to whether or not to use the license, or if the optimal decisions are not state
contingent so that the choice is effectively worthless. For example, one reason why decisions
may be state independent would be if the discount factor is so small that periods in effect
separale, and all the licenses are used at the beginning, irrespcctive of the demand state. Another
reason, explored later, is that cndogenous forces may make both using and not using the license
equally attractive.
In Period 3, using the license is the only sensible choice so there is no option value to
a license. In Periods I and 2, however, it may be valuable to be able to defer decisions on use
until after the uncertainty is resolved. If the optimal strategy involves such a state contingent
choice (e.g. holding the license in bad states and using it in the first good state), then an option
value component exists.
The option price component at any given period is given by the difference in the expected
license price before the revelation of uncertainty and the expected license price before the
revelation of uncertainty subject to the constraint that a decision onuse is made now4, The latter
price is given by E(L), Thus, the option price component equals E(L) -E(L)in Period i for i
5or 2: there is no option price component in Period 3.
Note that the license price falls over time. This is because the option price component
falls over time. For example, with N periods, 5=1, and U =0,the value from holding on to
a license in a bad stale at time I equals L" limes the probability that at least one good state will
occur in the remaining periods. This equals L" times one minus the probability that alt the
remaining periods have a bad state being realized. This value falls over time.
For N =3.5 (01), and I]- =0,13(L) equals irL". Also:
E(L1) =sml."(1+ö(1—st)+[a(1—it)121 (4)
The difference in F(L1) and E(L) is the option value component. This equals the discounted
expected value of a good state occurring some time in the future. Similarly, in Period 2:
E(L) =itL"[1÷ö(i-it)]. (5)
The difference in this and 13(L) is the option value component in Period 2. Notice that the option
value component is greater in earlier periods since more periods remain in which the license can
be used. In the first two periods, the license holder has the option of not using his license, and
this option has value. 1 the third (terminal) period, this option value disappears.
To summarize, the option value component of the license price exists because quota
licenses are issued at the beginning of Period 1 and are valid for three periods. The value of a
license prior to any information being revealed exceeds the expected price of the license at any
time in the future since a license allows the decision on use to be deferred till the state is knowo.
This is what is meant by the 'option" value of the license.
6Model 2:
1-tereweincorporatethe effect of "use-it-or-lose-it' policies on the value of a quota
license.Consider a model analogous to Model 1, but with the twist that using a license leads to
obtaining a new license in the next quotayear.Denote thevalueofa new licensebyR.
Forsimplicity, we use a two period version of Model t, which is illustrated in Figure
2. In Period 2, if a good state occurs, and the license is used, the holder obtains the license price
as well as the (discounted) value of a new license in the next quota period, i.e., L5 + oR; he
obtains nothing if the license is not used. lf a bad state occurs, using the ticense yields L +
OR, while not using the license again results in zero gain.
In Period I, if a good state occurs and the license is used, the license owner obtains L'1
+ 52R. If the license is not used, we go to Period 2 and nature moves, yielding a good or a bad
realization. The payoffs if the bad state occors in Period I are analogously defined. Note that
by recurrence, R must equal the value of holding a license at t= I ttthzc uncertainty is realized.
denoted by F(L1).
Theproblem is then solved backwards as usual. Since a license can always not be used,
R￿0. In the last stage, therefore, Licenses are always used as long as LL + OR > 0. We will
assume for the time being that this is so. Irrespective of the realization in the first period, the






whereE(L) is defined as before in Model 1 as:
7E(L) itL'1t(1n)LL. (7)
Ifa good state occurs in Period I, the license is always used as U' + YR > SElL,).If a bad
stateoccurs in Period I, the license will be used if I)- + 52R > SE(L2),i.e., ifU> SE(L),
or5 < L'IE(L). If LL > SE(L), the license will not be used. Thus the value of a license is






Notethat if 5 is large. E(L1) contains an option value component, which is the difference
between E(L3 and the best that can be obtained from choosing a given time to sell. The option
valun component is given by (l-r)[SE(L) - LLI; thus, it is equal to the probability of a bad
outcome in Period I times the gain from waiting in the event of a bad outcome. lf 5 is small.
no option value component exists as all the licenses will be used up in Period I irrespective of
the state.
Using the fact that E(L1) = R, we can solve for R:





Notethat R contains an option value component if 5 is large. However, this is not the case if
S is small, as the new license will be used up in the first period of the next quota year. From
8(6) and (9):
E(L.,)(166)E(L) +6(t—it)[SE(L)—L'i .1±-. - t-ô1 i_62 E(L)
(10)
= )E(L), ff8￿
IfS is Large, an option value existseven inPeriod2 since itenters E(L2)throughtherenewal
valuecomponent, RI
Now consider the case where LL < 0, so that S > L'-/E(L). Consider the price for a
temporary transfer of a license. It is easy to see that this couLd be negativel If a transfer is made
after the state is realized, say in Period 2, and it is a bad state, the price of license must be such
that using it yourself is as good as selling it at price pT, Selling it yields pT + SR in Period 2
and not selling it yields U + SR.6 Thus, pT = U < 0. Note also that a permanent transfer
would entail a choice between selling it for pF' and using it yourself wluch yields: max[0, U
+ SRI.Theprice nf a permanent transfer must be such that these are equal. Thus, P must be
non-negative. Note that in addition, the difference between the price of a permanent and
temporary transfer, (P" - PT), equals SR or the present value in Period 2 of renewal rights.7
Thus, while temporary transfers can be associated with negative prices, permanent transfers,
which are a transfer of the license and the renewal rights, cannot have negative prices.
Finally, some indication of the extent of the option value may be inferred from estimates
of the interest rate and the difference in temporary and permanent transfer prices. temporary
transfers have a price of E(L) on average, if there is no option value, the difference in the price
of temporary and permanent transfers of licenses equals the present discounted value of future
license price realizations E(L)!(lS). if renewal rights have an option value, X, the value of
9renewal rights rises, to E(L) + X]/(l-).Thus:
pF—= [E(L)+X]—r = — E(L). (U)
Averagelicense prices for temporary transfers can be used as a proxy for E(L) and the discount
factor can be proxied for using information on interest rates.
There are of course many problems with this approach. The implementation scheme is
quite complex in Hong Kong and all relevant components of it cannot be captured in such simple
models. Moreover, the scarcity value of quotas is not fixed over time as assumed here. Not only
are there swings over time in the use value of licenses with cyclical conditions and the entry of
new supplier countries, but Hong Kong quotas also are renegotiated. In fact, the MFA itself is
likely to be phased out!
Model 3:
The assumption thatthegain from using a license in any state is exogenously given is
averyspecial one, Consider now a model where (small)HongKongexporter/licenseholders
faceagiven,infinitely elastic US demand for their product. For simplicity, let their inverse
export supply curve be given by the linear function;
=0Q5. (12)
Suppose the only source of uncertainty is U.S. demand, which can be in either one of two
possible states:
l0p° =2 ifdeniir1d is high
('3)
pU) =a'ifdemandis low,
wherea'-< at'. Asbefore, the high demandstateoccurs with probability r, andthe low
demandstate with probability (I-it).
The model consists of two periods. V licenses are issued at the beginning of the first
period and they are valid for two periods. We assume that the quota is binding even in the low
demand period, so that V ￿ a'-Ie. License holders behave in a perfectly competitive manner.
Consider the second period first. Suppose there are V1 licenses left over from the first
period, where V2 ￿ V. All the V2 licenses will be used since this is the last period. If the
second period is a high demand period, the license price will he the difference between the high
demand price in the US and the price in Hong Kong when V2 units are supplied:
Lr=at'OV2 (14)
and if it is a low demand period, then the license price will be:
L=aL_OV2. (15)
Theexpected Period 2 license price is therefore:
E(L2V2) =isV'+(1-is)L
(16)
=ita + (1-n)a' — O1'2
atthe beginning of Period 2. Notice that the more licenses are remaining in Period 2, the lower
will be the actual and expected Period 2 license price. This reflects the scarcity value of the
license. This is depicted in Figure 3 --withO as the origin for V2, the expected value of
11licenses falls withasV, increases.
Now fold the problem back to Period I. If license holders are perfectly competitive, then
the value of using the license must equal the value of not using it. Exactly enough licenses will
be used in Period I in each state so that the Period 1 license price is equal to the discounted
value of the expected Period 2 license price, where the discount factor is given by 8 =11(1+r).
tn other words, V111 and V15 are chosen so as to satisfy:
a" —ov,"=
OE(L2IV1=V—V111) if Per/ad I demand is high,
oh- eVIL=8E(L2V2=V-V15 i/Period 1 demand is low,
In Figure 3, 01 is he origin for V1. The equilibrium Period 1 utilization and license price is thus
given by the intersection points in Figure 3. It is easy to solve the equations (17) for the
equilibrium Period I:





—bA+ OSV)jfPeriodI demand is low
and the equilibrium Period I license price:
L1A= _k_(a"+A-19')if Period 1 demand is high
1+6
(19)
=—-—(o" + A - 61')i/Period1 demand is low
1+6
where A =ira"+ (l-ir)a.
Therefore, the expected license price in Period 1 is:
125(L1) = nt + (I-n)Lf (20)






Since3 <1.it is evident that E(L) <E(L,),that is the ex ante expected license price rises
over time if the discount factor is less that one. According to this simple model, the rate of
growth of the license price. (1-3)13, equals the rate of interest if there is discounting. If there
is no discounting. then the license price stays constant. In either case, the option value
component of the license price is eliminated by the equilibrating mechanisms in the license
market and only the scarcity and asset value components remain. This result holds even if we
assume persistence of demand states.
This simple model thus suggests that the license price in any period is negatively related
to the number of licenses available in that period (as evident from (14) and (t5)) but that the
expected license price is positively related to the time period and negatively related to the quota
level (as seen from (20) and (21)). The license price is higher in good states than in bad, but in
good states, license utilization is also high. Thus, we can infer license price fixing tf the license
price rises but license utilization falls.
Note that the option price component is missing in this model since we assume that all
13solutions are "interior' ones. In a model wiLh many possible states, some of which lead to corner
solutions (for example, if some states exist where even if all existing licenses are used, it is
strictly preferable to use a license rather than hold on to it) the option value component will re-
emerge as there will be a gap in the value of using and not using a license. This option price
component could result in license prices falling over time.
Model 4:
Finally, let us consider the implications of imperfect competition in the license market.
This is made complex by the fact that most quota implementation procedures encourage license
holders to till their allotted quota. Given this aspect of the implementation procedure, imperfect
competition in the ticense market cannot restrict the supply of licenses over the entire period.
However, it can certainly affect the chosen path of license utilization relative to the path which
would obtain in the case of perfect competition. Thus it can affect the path of license prices as
well.
This point can be shown quite starkly with a slight modification of the previous model.
Suppose we retain the previous assumption that there are competitive suppliers of the restricted
product, with the supply price given by PS =SQ5as in equation (12); and that the U.S. demand
price is either aH (high) or a'- (low) as in equation (13). However, now suppose there is only one
license holder who obtains the product from the competitive suppliers and sells it in the quota
constrained U.S. market.
In Model 3, with perfectly competitive license holders, the expected license price in
Period I is given by equating the value of using the license in that state with the discounted
14value of holding on to the license for use in the next period, i.e.:
a1 - OV[1=5E(L2;VVjh)) (22)
where si denotes the state of demand in Period I, sI = H or L. The left hand side of the
equation, (as' -1" is a negative function of VL whilst the right hand side, ÔE(L2 I V-V1')
is a positive function of VLSi (i.e. a negative function of V2.) In Figure 4, their intersection at
C5 determines the equilibrium utilization and price (V1, L1119 if Period t is a high demand
state, and their intersection at CL determines the equilibrium (V°, L10) if Period 1 is a low
demand state.
Now consider the case of a monopolist license holder, who realizes that using more
licenses (i.e. exporting more of the quota constrained product) will raise the supply price of the
product. Whereas in the competitive case the equilibrium Period I license utilization and price
were found by equating the average revenue from using the licenses with the average revenue
from holding them for the next period, the relevant consideration for the monopolist license
holder is instead the marginal revenue from using his licenses in Period I versus tise marginal
revenue from holding oo to them. Now in Period I given the slate of demand sI, the marginal
revenue from using his licenses is:
MRf'= — 2eVj' (23)




where s2 denotes the state of demand in Period 2, s2 H or L. The license holder will choose
his Period I utilization so as to maintain indifference between the two choices of action. In
15Figure 4. the imersection W' denotes the equilibrium if Period 1 is a high demand state, and M'
denotes the equilibrium if Period 1 is a low demand state. The corresponding license utilizations
and prices are {V1, L1h) if Period 1 is a high demand state, and (VILO,LILO) ifPeriod I is
a lowdemandstate.
The exact location of the equilibrium points for the monopolist relative to the competitive
situation depends of course on factors such as the discount rate, the relative demand prices in
the Mo states and the probability of occurrence of the states. Our main point is simply that that
the utilization and price paths of the quota licenses are quite different with imperfect competition
than they are under perfect competition, even though the total utilization is the same in both
cases.
3. SomeRelated%Vprk
That quota licenses can be viewed as options is not a new insight. For example,
Anderson (1987) likens a quota license to an American-type put option, although he notes that
the endogeniety of license prices in any period makes the analogy with the option pricing
literature suspect. He shows that in a world of uncertainty licenses can have a positive price cx-
ante, even when the quota is unfilled in sonic states. He also considers the use-it-or-lose-it
requirement, where license holders are penalized for unfilled quotas by smaller allocations in
the next period. He points out that in this case license prices could be negative, since license
holders have an incentive to use their licenses in the current period, even at a loss, so as to be
assured of future allocations,
Eldor and Marcus (1988) extend Anderson's analysis, drawing upon the financial
16literature toobtainan explicitformula for the vaLuc of a quota License in a stochastic
environment. However, we argue below that their assumptions result in their model neglecting
a fundamental force which drives the market and which needs to be understood. The following
discussion uses the same model found in their paper, with the same notation for ease of
reference.
Let pt be the world price (and the price in the exporting country) where p* is a random
variable. Let p, be the price in the quota restricted country. This is endogenously determined
by demand and supply conditions. The difference between these two prices creates the scarcity
value of a license.
Since the license holder always has the option of not using his license, the license holder
can get a payoff of max[p, - pt, 0]. If PM is a constant, then as pt is a random variable, the
license becomes exactly like a put option which gives the holder the right to sell a unit of stock
at the price p, when the random market price is p. A clever trick in Eldor and Marcus shows
that this analogy can be exploited under certain assumptions.
Consider the value of a license which can be exercised on'y at the end of the whole
period, that is at time T. Let p denote the equilibrium price in the quota restricted market if
imports are exactly equal to the quota level. Assume (as do Eldor and Marcus) that the demand
and supply functions in the importing country are non stochastic. This makes PM a function of
the quota level alone. Let p' denote the price in the importing country for zero imports. that is
autarky. Of course, p1 > p. Now note that there are only three possibilities, which can he
summarized by cases (a), (b), and (c) below:
17(a)P5 > P > Pst
p1' and gives max[pa -p,0]max[pM -p,0]
(b)Pa ￿p ￿ p4.
Paq= p5. and gives max[p,5 - p*, 01 = max[pv - p5, 0]
(c) P,>P >
=PM.and gives max[pR -p5,01 =Max[pM-p*,0]
The three cases are illustrated in Figure 5.Incase (a) the equilibrium price isthe autarky
price.However, as the autarky price is less than the world price, the vatue of holding a license
is zero. Since p1 is even tower than the autarky price, the value of a license also equals the
maximum of (PM -p5)and zero. tn ease (b), the equilibrium price is the wortd price so that the
value of a license is exactly zero. Since PM is less than p5, again this license value equals the
maximum of (PM -PS)and zero. In case (c) the equilibrium price is PMsothat the license price
is positive and again equals the maximum of (PM -p5)and zero.
This is the clever trick used in the Eldor-Marcus paper. Although P,qisan endogcnous
variable and depends on the realization of PS, the value of a license can be expressed as a
function of PM and p alone in each state, Since PM depends only on the number of licenses
available, it is a constant, This makes the license resemble a European-style put option.
however, in practice, licenses may be exercised at any time during the quota period. tn
extending their model to allow for this, Eldor and Marcus assume that as licenses are used up
over a year, they are replenished to the set quota level. This assumption ensures that PM does
not vary over [he year and makes the problem exactly like that of valuing an American-style put
optiun!
4
tgHowever, this assumption is inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, a key factor
determining the time path of licenses over the quota period is the relationship beiween future
prices and current prices through the effect of current use on future availability. Second.
incorporating the effect of current use on future availability and prices shows that the option
price component is much less important than it seems. In fact, under plausible circumstances as
in Model 3, it may not even exist! When it does exist, of course, this option value falls as the
year progresses. As quota allocations are usually valid only for one calendar year, we would
expect a license to have no value at the end of the year. En addition, the Etdor-Marcus model
is not entirely appropriate in the case of IJ.S.-t-tong Kong apparel trade, since future allocations
of licenses are related to current usage so that even negative prices for temporary transfers of
licenses can occur.
4.Conclusion
tn this paper we studied the determinants of the price path of a quota license over its
validity period. We argued that the dynamic aspects of the problem in an uncertain environment,
together with the usual policy of rewarding high license utilization with future license
allocations, creates four components of the license price. These are the scarcity, option value!
asset market, and renewal value components. By contrast, static models have only the scarcity
value. We showed that the renewal value component also has an option value clement and
suggested ways of getting a handle on the option value component.
We also showed that the usual treatment of the option value component as in the work
of Eldor and Marcus (1988) neglects an essential part of the problem. Eldor and Marcus claim
19that theysolve the problems posed by the endogeneityof the license price. However, they do
this by assuming that there is a constantnumberof licenses at all times because licenses are
continuously replenished as they are exercised, although the new licenses are not necessarily
issued to the current license holders. This assumption is critical to their results since it makes
the license price in the future independent of the number of licenses used today. If the number
of licenses in the next period is allowed to vary, the price realizations in the next period will
also vary. This endogeneity in price is what eçuates the value of current exercise and holding
the asset until further information is revealed, and this eliminates the option price component
for intenor solutions. Neither Anderson nor Eldor and Marcus test tlseir models empiricalty with
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26END NOTE
I. The operation of the Hong Kong quota system for textile and apparel exports under the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement is documented in Textiles Exrt2ontrol System, I-long Kong
Trade Department (Hong Kong: Government Printer), 1987.
2, Note that other assumptions which result in the same license price realizations (such as
supply side uncertainty) can also be used to motivate the model.
3. Specifically, this holds as long as;
6>
+
4. For another application of option value see van Wijnhergen (1985).
5,If4 is small enough, then all licenses wilt be used in the Period 1, even if it is a low
demand state, and the transaction price will he U. In this case, there is of course no
option value component in any period.
6. Note that we are assuming all temporary transfers are used. This is an appropriate
assumption as tong as the transfer price is positive, since the only reason to buy a license
would be to use it. However, if the transfer price is negative, this need not be a good
assumption since renewal rights are not sold to the transferee and this creates a moral
hazard problem. Tranferees have an incentive to take the money and run. If there is
no way to ensure use, then such teEnporary transfers will not be made; only permanent
ones will be made. If temporary transfers are made, then their price will reflect the
possibility of losing renewal rights and will exceed the use value of the license.
7. Note that the difference in permanent and temporary license prices is in general equal to
the present value of renewal rights as this is the only difference in these two transfer
forms.
27PART II.
LICENSE PRICE PATHS; EVmENCE FROM HONG Kjjj
I. Jntrodu&th2p
The MFA, or Multi-Fibre Arrangement, is among the most important non-tariff trade
barriers facing developing countries today. It sanctions a structure of country- and
product-specific quotas on apparel and textiles exported by developing countries to developed
countries.
The MFA has beer widely studied and much attention has been devoted to its welfare
consequences.' For example, Morkre (1984) estimates that U.S. clothing import quotas on Hong
Kong in 1980 gaverise to quotarents of $218 million, or 23 per cent of the total value of
clothingimports from Hong Kong; Hamilton (1986) calculates the import tariff equivalent rate
oftextileand apparel quotas onHong Kong tobe9 percentin1981 and 37percent in 1982;
and Trcla and Whalley (1988, 1990) suggest globai gains from the elimination of quotas and
tariffsof more than817 billion (of which SI1 billionwill accrue to developing countries)and
gainstotheU.S.from theremoval of quotas of$3 billion.
These estimates are based on static models which assume perfect competition in all
relevantmarkets. In such models, as is well known, tariffs and quotas are equivalent and license
prices,whenavailable, reflect the scarcity induced by the quotas and equal the iissplicitspecific
tariff. The usualpracticein these empirical studies istotakethequota license price as a measure
of the wedge between import price and unit cost in the exporting country and to take the ad
valorem tariff equivalent as a measure of restrictiveness of the quota,'In dynamic settings, the license price has two additional components, both of which are
related to the property that a license is valid for an entire year. The first of these is the asset
market component. A quota license can be viewed as an asset with a life of one year. Like any
other asset, the price path of the license must be such that it is held voluntarily. For this to occur
in a world without uncertainty, the price of the asset must rise at the rate of interest, as the latter
represents the opportunity cost of holding the asset. Therefore, the asset market component
predicts that the price of a license will rise over the year.
The second additional component of the license price is the option value component. At
any point in time during the year, a quota holder can either use his license (by shipping the
goods himself or by maldng a temporary transfer to someone else) or defer his license
application in the hope of a higher price in the future if demand realizations are high. The value
of a license held today, before the state tomorrow is known, can exceed the expected price of
the license at any time in the future since a license allows the decision on use to be deferred till
the state is known. In other words, a quota license has an option' value.
In addition, the details of the quota allocation mechanism can create other complications
which affect the license price. For example, quota allocations may be tied to past performance,
as is the case in Hong Kong and most other exporting countries, where firms with a high quota
utilization are rewarded with an increased allocation in the next period. This creates a renewal
value component of the license price. These components of the license price are studied in a
companion paper, Krishna and Tan (1992). Earlier work on this area includes that of Anderson
(1987) and Eldor and Marcus (1988). However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical work
on license price paths.
2The case of 1-long Kong is the most frequentty studied, one reason being that 1-long Kong
quota prices are relatively easy to obtain, since their quota licenses are traded on the open
market, In studying other exporting countries, where quota prices are harder to come by,
researchers often use I-tong Kong quota prices as proxies.3 Moreover, even when weekly or
monthly license price data are available, the usual procedure is to avenge the license prices over
the year since complementary data are usually available only aooually. This is the approach used
in Morkre (1984), Hamilton (1986) and Trela and Whailey (1988), for example.
There are two problems with doing this. First, as licenses are valid for an cotire year,
and there is uncertainty, the simple static model is not quite adequate. In such an environment,
license prices have a number of components as indicated above, not just the scarcity component
of the standard static model, Thus, it is not clear exactly what the average license price
represents! Second, this averaging procedure effectively discards a huge amount of economically
relavant information, which can be used to shed tight on other interesting questions.
In this paper, we study the dynamic behavior of license prices in a competitive market.
We then test for deviations from this paradigm. To our knowledge, this avenue has not been
explored to date. We base our empirical study on Hong Kong data. Our choice is pragmatic
because of the availability of data on licenses for Hong Kong. In addition, licenses are relatively
freely traded in Hong Kong compared to other MFA-restricted countries, and the quota
implementaLion process is clearly documented. As a result, it is the least likely to exhibh
behavior consistent with market imperfections.
Even so, allegations of license price-rigging in Hong Kong are made from time to time
in the textile trade journals, although the evidence put forth to support these claims is not always
3convincing. For example, editorials in the trade journal, Textile Asia, claim that the
availability of quota at the beginning of the year is limited by the operations of holders
determined to wait till what seems the best possible price is attained, 'andas a result. 'quota
price fluctuations do not in fact reflect normal supply and demand but the course of manipulation
by the quota holders.'5 Note that the first of the two quotes is not inconsistent with perfect
competition in an uncertain environment, and the second is merely an assertion. Other assertions
of price fixing point to high license prices as evidence. However, this could be a reflection of
competitive responses to market conditions, such as high demand realizations, and not price
fixing. We provide the first attempt to test such claims in a coherent manner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple demand and supply model
which provides the basis for the econometric model used. Section 3 outlines the details of Hong
Kong's textile quota systemS Section 4 discusses the data we use. Section 5 eatinsates the model
developed and looks at whether there is evidence of market power in the license market. Section
6 summarizes our results and makes some concluding remarks.
2. Developing a Testable Model
In a companion paper, Krishna and Tan (1992), we present some simple models to
illustrate the various components which enter into the price of a license at any given time, We
identified four major components of a quota license price. The first, most obvious componenti
the scarcity component of the license price. ln a static perfectly competitive model, a quota
license has a scarcity value because a binding quota, by creating scarcity in the domestic market,
raises the domestic price of the restrained good above the world price, resulting in profits equal
4to this price dilfcrence for the license holders. In dynamic settings, the license price has two
additional components, both of which are related to the property that a license is valid for an
entire year. These are the asset market component and the option value component. A quota
license can be viewed as an asset with a life of one year, and, like any other asset, the price path
of the license must he such that the license is held voluntarily. For this to occur in a world
without uncertainty, the price of the asset must rise at the rate of interest as the latter represents
the opportunity cost of holding the asset. Therefore, the asset market component predicts that
the price of a license witl rise over the year.
The third component of the license price is the option value component. At any point in
time during the year, a quota holder can either use his license (by shipping the goods himself
or by malcing a temporary transfer to someone else) or defer his license application in the hope
of a higher price in the future if demand realizations are high. The value of a license held today,
before the state tomorrow is known, can exceed the expected price of the license at any time in
the future since a license allows the decision on use to be deferred till the state is known. In
other words, a quota license has an "option" value, which is high in the beginning of the year,
then tapers off to zero towards the end of the year.
In addition, the details of quota allocation mechanism can create other complications
which affect license prices. In Hong Kong, quota allocations are tied to past performance, where
firms with a high quota utilization are rewarded with an increased allocation in the next period.
This creates a renewal value component of the license price. A legal market exists in Hong Kong
for both temporary and permanent transfers of licenses to export textiles and apparel under the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Under a permanent transfer, the seller relinquishes the use of his
5hcense in the current, and all future periods. Under a temporary transfer, hoewver, the seller
loses the use of his license in the current period, but retains his renewal rights. This can create
negative prices for temporary transfers of licenses as pointed out by Anderson (1987), and
further discussed in Odor and Marcus (1988).
It is apparent from the discussion in Krishna and Tan (1992) that license price paths are
complicated phenomena to model, and simply observing these time paths will not enable us to
draw any conclusions about the existence of imperfect competition in the license market.
In this section, we develop the model on which our econometric work will he based. As
far as possible, we try to capture all the theoretical considerations raised iii Krishna and Tan
(1992). There are T time periods, indexed by t = 1 T, in a qaota year. In each time period,
there is a demand for and supply of licenses as a function of their price. The demand for licenses
is straightforward. It is based on the excess demand for apparel in the importing country, that
is, demand in the importing country less supply from all other sources.
This is denoted by:
() (_) (_) (+) nir u U
L'.jpit'
where:
L5= License price of category i at time I.
C1 = Cost of production in Hong Kong for category i at time I.
= An index of retail sales in the U.S.
H1,= The numbers equivalent of the Herfindafll index of concentration.
The expected signs of the partial derivatives are indicated above the variables and
6explained below. Demand depends on the full price of the good produced in Hong Kong. The
full price includes the price in Hong Kong, the license price, and any search costs involved in
obtaining a license, The Hong Kong price is positively related to the cost of production in Hong
Kong. so that as the cost of production rises in Hong Kong, demand for licenses falls. As this
full price is inclusive of the license price, increases in the license price also reduce demand. The
numbers equivalent of the Fterfindahl index is a proxy for the number of equal sized firms that
own licenses. Thus it provides an indication of the extent of concentration in license holdings.
Demand would fall with a decrease in concentration (i.e. an increase in the numbers equivalent)
if this leads to higher search costs, which have to be included in the true cost of doing
business.6
Now consider the supply side. At each point in time, a license holder must decide
whether to use his license or hold on to it for another period. The supply of licenses in category





A, is the total availability of licenses at tine t in category i. As before, denotes costs in
the exporting country, Hong Kong.
As usual, SjL(•)increaseswith the current license price, Li,, Supply also rises as Aj(T-t)
rises; this is because an increased availability of licenses relative to the amount of time
remaining lowers their expected price in the future, and this in turn lowers the value of holding
on to a license. The supply of licenses should also rise with the Hong Kong cost of production,
given a license price, ea this reduces the value of holding on to a license. Finally, other things
7constant, supply may also depend on the time period, t, itself; the option value argument predicts
that supply will be larger in later months when there is less of an option value in holding on to
a license; on the other hand, asset price arguments predict the opposite as in later months, higher
license prices will be required to elicit the same supply as license holders must be compensated
for interest forgone in holding a license.7
tn a competitive setting, Ha should not affect supply. If the license market is not
competitive, it is not obvious that greater concentration would reduce the entire supply path, as
the past performance rute in the quota allocation mechanism encourages lull utilization of
licenses. However, it could certainly affect the path of quota utilization over the year and
thereby raise license prices. This is discussed further helow.
tn equilibrium, demand equals supply;
Dj)
= L1 (3)
The equilibrium level of quota utilization is denoted by U1,. Both U5 and L5 are observed
monthly. Equations (l)-(3) make up the structural form of the simultaneous equations model.
The endogenous variables of the system are demand (D53, supply (SLL)andthe license price (U,
Wewill ñrst estimate the reduced form of the system. It is easy to verify that the reduced
form of the simultaneous equation system allows os to solve for the license price and quota
utilization in any period as a function of the exogenous variables in the model. This gives;
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Anincrease in the U.S. retail sales index, R;1, shifts D,(.) nut, raising the equilibrium
license price. L(.), and quota utlization, U(s). If search costs are substantial, then an increase
in H,, will shift Da(s) in, so that L5(.) and Un(s) fall in equilibrium. An increase in C° will
shift the supply for licenses outward and the demand for licenses inward. This will lower L1,(.)
and can raise or lower U1,(.). It raises UL(s) if the supply shift effect dominates, and reduces
U(') if the demand shift effect dominates. An increase in A,f(T-t) shifts R(•)outward,
reducing LIL(s)andraising U1(.).
The effect of an increase in t is ambiguous. However, it should have opposite effects on
prices and quantities. This model provides the motivation for the reduced form and structural
equations we run in Section 5. We now proceed to describe the working of the Hong Kong quota
system and the data we use in the next two sections.
3. Hong Kong's Textile Ouota System
Hong Kong prides itself on administering an efficient textile quota system. The initial
quota allocation is historically based, Past performance, transfers and quota level changes guide
the process by which these allocations change in subsequent years.
When a product category is newly brought under restraint, the quotas are allocated
according to past performance5, i.e. each company gets a quota amount corresponding to its
share in total shipments of that particular category to the market concerned. Where the
manufacturer and the exporter are not the same company, they each share the quota pertaining
9to a shipment on a 50/50 basis.9 lithe level of total shipments exceeds the restraint limit, the
allocations are scaled down proportionately, lithe quota is more generous than total past
performance, then the balance remaining is put into a wfree quota poor, which is open to any
firm registered with the Hong Kong Trade Department which has documentary proof of an
nverseas order.
Quota holders are allowed to transfer a part of their quota to other firms. There are two
types of quota transfers: permanent transfers, in which the transferee obtains the use of the quota
for the year in question and, based on its performance against the transferred amount, receives
a quota allocation in the following year; and temporary transfers, in which the transferee obtains
the use of the quota for the year in question, but the performance against the transferred quantity
is attrihuted to the transferor. In order to allow sufficient time for the transferee to obtain the
quota, transFer applications are not normalty accepted after the middle of P4ovember. Free quotas
are not transferable.
Under Hong Kong's textile quota system, both the utilization rate and the amount of
traosfers are important factors in determining a firm's future quota allocation. A firm which uses
less than 95 per cent of its quota holding wilt obtain an allocation in the subsequent year equal
to the amount it used; a firm which uses 95 per cent or more of its quota holding will be given
an allocation equal to 100 per cent of its holding; and a firm which uses 95 per cent or more of
its quota holding and does not traosfer out any of its quota (on either a temporary or permanent
basis) will be awarded an additional amount equivalent to the growth factor for that category
provided for in the restraint agreement.
In addition, a firm which transfers out 50 per cent or more of its quota holdings on a
10temporary basis in a year is liable to have its quota allocation reduced in the following year.'1
whereas a firm which transfers in 35percent or more of its quota holdings on a temporary basis
during the year is eligible for a bonus allocation in the following year.
Finally, a firm which obtains a free quota and utilizes 95percent or more of it qualifies
fur a quota allocation in the subsequent year; a firm which fails to utilize at least 95percent of
its free quota may be debarred from future participation in free quota schemes for a pcriod of
time.
Tn a certain extent, unused quotas may be transferred between categories (under the
'swing provision') and between years (under the "carryover' and 'carry-forward provisions").
As quota entitlements in a subsequent restraint period are based on shipment performance
in the preceding period, quotas can only be allocated after this performance has been fully
verified against shipping documents. This verification process usually takes two to three months.
In order to make a portion of the quotas available during the first few months of she year,
therefore, the Trade Department makes preliminary quota allocations to companies. Final quota
allocations are normally made in March and they supersede any preliminary allocations.
All textile and apparel exports from Hong Kong have to be covered by valid export
licenses issued by the Director of Trade. Export licenses are only issued to firms which arc able
to supply quota to cover the consignment in question. Valid licenses are required to bring the
shipment on board, An export license is normally valid for 28 days from the date of issue (or,
where applicable, until the end of the year, whichever is earlier). The consignment must be
shipped within this period. The final licensing date is the first day of December, All licenses
covering shipments applied for against quotas held by a company have to be taken out nol later
11than this date, although shipments may be effeeted up to the last day of the year.
Further details of Hong Kong's textile quota system can be found in the Hong Kong
Trade Department publication, Textiles Export Control yjtem A good description of the system
is also contained in Morkre (1979, 1984),
4. The Data
The data utilized in this study cover the time period 1982-88. They are classified
according to MFA categories. Since the quota licenses are MFA category specific, we have no
aggregation problems. We do not have information on all categories for the entire period
However, we believe our data are the best available and that they suffice for our purposes.
As described in the previous section, quota licenses in Hong Kong are transferable to a
certain extent. However, there is no systematic record of the transactions and we owe a great
deal to Carl Hamilton at the University of Stockholm's Institute for International Economic
Studies and Peter Ngan of the Federation of Hong Kong Garment Manufacturers, who provided
us with monthly license prices for many MFA categories. Additional information was obtained
from Textile Asia, which frequently tracks quota license prices. The license prices (L.,) are
prices for temporary transfers and are expressed in Hong Kong dollars per dozen pieces. They
are monthly averages unless otherwise stated.
Aside from monthly license prices, we also collected data on monthly quota utilization,
cumulative (year-to-date) quota utilization and annual quota levels by MFA category. These
figures are published monthly in the Notice to Exporters Series 1A fUSA documented by the
Trade Industry and Customs Department of Hong Kong. The quota level (VJ, monthly quota
12utilization (U1,)andcumulative quota utilization (EU1,) are expressed in dozens of pieces. From
these, we calculated the availability of licenses for the rest of the year, A,,, as:
=
v5_EU. (6)
Monthly Hong Knng costs (Cjj°) were proxied by monthly wage rates in Hong Kong's
apparel sector. These were approximated as the total monthly payroll in that sector divided by
the number of persons engaged, using data published in the Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics. The state of demand in the U.S. was proxied by an index of retail sales, R,,.
We obtained information on the license allocation in Hong Kong for the years 1982 and
1986 through 1988 from the Quota Holders' List issued by the Textile Controls Registry in I-Tong
Kong. We computed the numbers equivalent of the Herfindaktl index of concentration in license
holding (HJ for each MFA category using these license allocation data.LThenumbers
equivalent is inversely related to the degree of concentration. FInally, (T-t) was taken as the
number of months remaining in the year.
5. TestingJor License Market Imperfections
Our first approach to testing for license market imperfections is to use regression analysis
to estimate the reduced form equations developed in Section 3. We ran the following log-linear
model to capture the competitive model developed above:'2
The data were pooled across time and categories, 7 years and 22 categories in all. In the
above equations, the subscript i represents the MFA category and the subscript t represents the
month in which the observation was made, where t=l,...,12. The variable (T-t) therefore
13log(L5)
s- ÷ + P4R+ + J36H5(T—r)+
+ + + C.
log(LJ)1J+
V5(T-r)
÷1l(T—r)÷p'(T-r)2i- + + 3H(T—t)+
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denotes the amount of time remainingfrom the beginningof month t for which the license can
be used. and is computed simply as (13-t). Note that the log-linear specification enables 2
be interpreted as the rate of change of the license price. We took into consideration the fact that
the quota utilization and license price paths over time may not be linear by including as well the
quadratic term, (T-t) as an explanatory variable.
The variable H1(T-t) is an interaction term to capture the effect of the concentration in
license holdings as a function of time. This term was introduced to take into account the
possibility raised in Section 3 that in the absence of perfect competition, concentration in license
holdings could affect the time path of quota utilization. Clearly, if the license market were
competitive. should have no effect on the supply of licenses. But even in the case ol
imperfect competition, the past performance rute in the quota allocation mechanism should
ensure that H11 would not affect the entire suppty path of licenses; since license holders are
penalized for under-utilization with reduced allocations in the following year, they would have
no incentive to restrict the supply of licenses for the entire year in the hopes of driving up the
license price. However, as discussed in Krishna and Tan (1992). imperfect competition in the
14license market would result in license price and utilization paths quite different from the
competitive case. The (percentage) effect of license hotding concentration on the equilibrium
utilization at time t is thus given in Equation (7) as 85' + 136'(T-t).
We also scaled the variable A,j(T-t) by the quota level, V5. rendering it unit-free. This
was done in order to maintain comparability between categories in the pooted data set. This
variable captures the scarcity component of the license price. Finally, we included category
dummies, D, jI21 to permit different levels of license prices and quota utilization across
categories, and year dummies 't', k=l6, to allow for annual variations.
The results nf the OLS estimation of the reduced form equations are given in Tables i(s)
and 1(b). Also included in the tables are the expected signs of the coefficients un the independent
vanables which follow from equations (4) and (5)inSection 2.
As predicted, an increase in availability always reduces the equilibrium ticcnsc price and
increases the equilibrium quantity utilized at any time t; and an increase in retail sales in the
U.S. tends to increase both the equilibrium license price and the equilibrium quota utilization
at time t. An increase in Hong Kong costs (as proxied by the wage per worker in the apparel
sector) lowers the equilibrium license price as expected, and raises the equilibrium quota
utilization --thissuggests that its effect on the supply of licenses outweighs its effect on the
demand for licenses.
The time path of the equilibrium quota utilization is quadratic, with the utilization
increasing (at a decreasing rate) from January until the middle of the year, after which it starts




• -0.5054 +0.0764(T - r)-0.0071!,
wheret=l (and T4=12)in January,t=2(andT-t=l1)inFebruary, and so on, and H ranges
from 12 to 65. The time path of the equilibrium license price is also quadratic but in the
opposite direction, with the license price decreasing from January until the last quarter of the





Asdiscussed in Krishna and Tan (1992), the asset market component predicts that the license
price will rise over time, whereas the option value component predicts that the license price will
fall over the course of the year. Equation (9) shows thatwith thescarcity component controlled
for,thelicense pricepath indeedreflects the influence oftheoption value component in the
beginningof theyear,withthe asset marketcomponentcoming into playtowards theendofthe
year.
The numbers equivalent is not significantly different from zero in both equations.
indicating that search costs are not too important. Interestingly, however, the interaction term,
H,(T-t) is significantly positive in the utilization equation and significantly negative in the license
price equation, This means that an increase in license holding concentration decreases the slope
of the license price path, making it fall more steeply and rise more gradually than the
competitive path)3 Conversely, an increase in license holding concentration increases the slope
16of the license utilization path, making it rise more steeply and fall more gradually than the
competitive path.'4 This indicates that the equilibrium ticense price and quota utilization paths
are indeed affected by the concentration in ticense holdings, a result which is strongly suggestive
of imperfect competition in the ticense market.
The reduced form estimates, therefore, suggest that the competitive models implications
are not quite borne out. In order to provide a further check, we estimate the structural equations
using two stage least squares. It is easy to confirm that using exclusion restrictions alone permits
identification of our simultaneous equations system although the structural equations are
overidcntified. If the interaction term enters the supply function in a significant manner, we have
some evidence of imperfections in the market.
The structural form equations we estimated were:
tog(D14) =e
—a1tog(L)
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The results, together with the expected signs of the coefficients from equations (I) and (2), are
presented in Tables 2(a) and 2(b). Notice that the coefficient on log(L) in the supply equation
is not significantly different from zerol A competitive license market would predict a positive
sign on cii',withmore licenses being supplied when the license price is high; hence, this
coefficient estimate is consistent with an imperfectly competitive license market, where such a
relation need not be observed, Furthermore, the interaction term HLI(T-t) is positive and
17signiticant. indicating that a reduction in the numbers equivalent (i.e. an increase in
concentration) towers the supply of licenses in the beginning of the year more than in the tatter
part of the year. Again, this is suggestive of imperfect competition in the license market.
The demand equation is of less interest here. It suffices to note that the coefficient on
log(L,) is negative and significant in this equation, and the coefficient on R1 is positive and
significant, as expected. Search costs are not an important consideration, since the coefficient
on H, is not significantly different from zero. Somewhat surprisingly, the wage variable is also
not statistically significant (and wrong signed.)
Our estimation of both the structural and reduced forms of the simultaneous equations
model thus casts some doubt on the existence of perfect competition in the Hong Kong license
market. Both sets of regressions point to the fact that the degree of concentration in license
holdings does have a significant impact on the time path of the license prices and quota
utilization.
6. Conclusion
Our main objective in this paper was to test the hypothesis of perfect competition in the
market for apparel quota licenses. Drawing on the simple models in our companion paper,
Krishna and Tan (1992), we attempted to model the demand and supply of licenses, taking into
special consideration the various components affecting the license price, such as the scarcity
component, the option value component, and the asset market component. By introducing an
interaction term of the numbers equivalent and the time remaining for the quota to be used, we
found that the concentration in license holdings had a significant impact on the equilibrium time
18paths of the license price and quota utilization. This accords well with the discussion in Krishna
and Tan (1992) which points out that the license utilization and price paths with imperfect
competition in the license market may be quite different from the corresponding paths in the
competitive case, even though the totat utilization of ticenses remains the same.
Finally, we also estimated the structural demand and supply equations of the model, and
this turned up further evidence of imperfect competition in the license market. The supply
equation, in particular, was characterized by a statistically significant interaction term, and a
price elasticity that was not significantly different from zero.
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Dependentvariable = log(U1L)
Independent Expected sign









T-t 0.5054 l0.877P (7)
(0 .0465)
(T-t)2 -0.0382 -13.0172 (2)
(0.0029)
H1, 0.0001 0.0189 (-)
(0 .0066)




21 category dummiesand6 year dummies included.
Number ofobservations= 662
Standarderrors in parentheses.
'From Equation (5)fora competitive model.
s: Significant at the 1 per cent level.
: Significant at the 5percent level.
C: Significant at the 10 per cent level.
d: Significant at the 20 per cent level.TABLEIfk
ESTIMATE OF REDUCED FORM REGRESSION (7. LICENSEPRICE EOUATION
Dependent variable =log(L1)
Independent Expected sign







-6.8906 -6 .5994' (-)
(1.0441)




H, 0.0014 0.1848 (-)
(0.0076)




21 category dummies and 6 year dummies included.
Number of observations =662
Standard errors in parentheses.
'From Equation (4) for a competitive model.
': Significant at the I per cent level.
b:Significantat the 5 per cent level.
Significant at the 10 per cent level.
d:Significantat the 20 per cent level.TABLE 2fa
ESTIMATE OF STRUCTURALEQUATIONS (8). SUPPLY EOUATION
Dependent variable =Iog(S1J
Independent Expected sign
Variable Coefficient t Statistic of coefficienC
Constant 6.6071 8.7585'
(0.7544)
log(L1) 0.1103 0.7195 (+)
(0. 1533)




T-t 0.5119 11.1265' (1)
(0.0460)






21 category dummies and 6 year dummies included.
Number of observations662
Standard errors in parentheses.
From Equation (2) for a competitive model.
': Significant at the 1 per cent level.
b:Significantat the 5 per cent level.
: Significant at the 10 per cent level.
d:Significantat the 20 per cent level.TABLE 2(b)
ESTIMATE OF STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS (7). DEMAND EOUATION
Dependent variable =Iog(D.13
Independent Expected sign













21 category dummies and 6 year dummies included.
Number of observations662
Standard errors in parentheses.
From Equation (1) for a competitive model.
': Significant at the 1 per cent level.
b;Significantat the S per cent level.
: Significant at the 10 per cent level.
1:Significantat the 20 per cent level.END NOTES
1. See,for example, Hamilton (1990) which analyzesthe effects oftheMFA andits
proposed reforms from a variety of viewpoints.
2 This is the method used by Morkre (1984), for example, as well as by Trela and Whalley
(1988, 1990.)
3. For example, Trela and Whalley (1988, 1990) compute the Hong Kong supply price by
subtracting the quota price from the US price. They then compute the productiun costs
of quota restricted products in other exporting countries by multiplying the unit cost in
Hong Kong with the ratio of the exporting country's relative wage in the textile and
apparel industry compared to Hong Kong. However, this approach assumes that the
standard competitive model is the appropriate one, Krishna, Martin and Tan (1992)
shows that this approach yields significant overestimates of actual license prices, casting
into doubt all welfare calculations based on these estimates, as well as the standard static
model on which this procedure is based.
4.]tjlji, February 1989, p.11.
5. Textile Asia, March 1989, p.19.
6. We could also include U.S. costs of production as an explanatory variable since demand
for Hong Kong apparel is defined as excess supply over supply from other sources,
including the U.S.
7. In a competitive market, U.S. costs, given a license price, should not affect the supply
of licenses, although they could affect the demand for licenses, as could the costs in other
exporting countries.
8. The reference period is usually the most recent 12-month period for which shipment
performance can be ascertained prior to the introduction of the restraint.
9. in the case of finished piece-goods, quotas are allocated on a 40/30130basisamong the
exporter, the finisher and the weaver. In the case of finished fabrics manufactured using
imported grey fabrics, quotas are allocated on a 50150 basis to the exporter and the
finisher.
10.This amount was reduced to 35 per cent in June 1985, but was changed back to 50 per
cent in July of the following year.
11.MFA category 338/9 is further divided into subcategories 338/9-T (tank tops) and 338/9-
O (other.) We have the herfindahi indices, quota levels and monthly utilizations for the
subcategories, but license prices only for the category 338/9 as a whole. Therefore, we
had to compute the herfindahl index for category 33 8/9 by taking the weighted average
(by quota level) of the herfindahl indices of the subcategories.2.The log-linear model is simplyanapprosimation. We also ran the modeF in linear form
and nhtained essentially the same results.




14.Differentiating (8) w.r.t. H, we have:
Or =- = -0.0007.
OH6